



SME Digital Advisor

Plain-English advice on digital risk

OWASP - 10 CARDS

OWASP Top 10 Flashcards

The OWASP Top 10 web application security risks, translated.

Reference site for SME owners. Free. No sign-up.

Companion to andrewreaassociates.com

smedigitaladvisor.co.uk

Can the wrong person on your website see or change the wrong data?

The most common web-application flaw. About whether the website properly enforces who can do what once someone's logged in.

What you can do:

1. Ask your developer for the **access-control matrix**: who can see and do what.
2. Run the "different user" test: log in as a regular customer, try `/admin` or other customers' data.
3. For anything handling money or personal data, have an external pen test before launch and annually after.

Is sensitive data scrambled properly when it's stored or sent?

Two things: data sent over the internet, and data stored on disk. Classic failures: HTTPS not enforced everywhere, passwords stored as plain text, sensitive data sat unencrypted in a database.

What you can do:

1. Test your site's TLS with SSL Labs. Aim for an A grade.
2. Ask your developer: "Show me how passwords are stored." If they can decrypt them, the design is wrong.
3. Don't keep what you don't need. Delete old customer records on a schedule.

Can someone trick your website into running their own commands?

The classic web flaw and still common: user-typed input passed directly to a database or system command.

What you can do:

1. Insist that parameterised queries (or the framework's ORM) are used everywhere.
2. Run a free automated scan with OWASP ZAP.
3. For business-critical applications, pay for a penetration test.

Was the website designed to handle attack, or just good behaviour?

Some flaws can't be patched — they're built into the design. A password-reset flow with no rate limiting. A checkout that trusts the price the browser sends.

What you can do:

1. For new applications, ask: "*What did you think about misuse before features?*"
2. Run a five-minute "what would I try as an attacker?" exercise.
3. Add **rate limiting** on failed logins, password resets, account creation, contact forms.

Are your servers and tools properly locked down?

Default passwords. Admin interfaces facing the internet. Verbose error messages. Cloud storage buckets accidentally public.

What you can do:

1. Run Security Headers on your site. Aim for B+.
2. Check admin paths (`/admin`, `/wp-admin`, `/phpmyadmin`). Restrict by IP or VPN.
3. For cloud users, use Defender for Cloud / AWS Trusted Advisor / Google SCC.

Is your website built on software with known holes?

Most websites are built from many bits — CMS, plugins, libraries. If anything's out of date, the website inherits the holes.

What you can do:

1. For WordPress: use a **managed WP host** (WP Engine, Kinsta, SiteGround) that handles patching.
2. Ask your developer for an **SBOM**: which libraries and what version.
3. Set a monthly calendar reminder: review and apply CMS / plugin / library updates.

Is your login system actually secure?

Classic mistakes: no rate limiting on failed logins, predictable password resets, sessions that never expire, no MFA.

What you can do:

1. Use a recognised authentication provider (Auth0, Microsoft Entra ID, AWS Cognito, Okta, Clerk).
2. Enforce **MFA** for any account handling money or personal data.
3. Set sensible password rules (long over complex), use modern hashing (bcrypt/argon2), rate-limit attempts.

Can someone tamper with your software or data updates without you noticing?

How modern software updates itself. Auto-updates from untrusted sources or unverified library pulls can be poisoned.

What you can do:

1. Pin third-party library versions; don't auto-pull the latest.
2. Limit who can deploy code. Two-person review on production deploys.
3. If you write code, sign your releases. If you don't, ask vendors how they sign theirs.

Would you know if your website was being attacked?

Average detection time is around 200 days. Usually because nobody was watching.

What you can do:

1. Log authentication, admin actions, and errors. Send logs off the server.
2. Set basic alerts: failed-login bursts, new admin users, bulk data exports.
3. For serious sites, a managed monitoring service should be watching out of hours.

Can someone use your website as a proxy to reach private systems?

Some websites let users provide a URL. If the website blindly fetches that URL, an attacker can provide an internal URL and pull private data.

What you can do:

1. Block server-side requests to **internal IP ranges** (10.x, 172.16–31.x, 192.168.x, 169.254.x).
2. On AWS, ensure **IMDSv2** is required. Equivalents on Azure and GCP.
3. Where possible, **allowlist external destinations**.